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Another Look at Pesticide Productivity and Pest Damage
Since the contribution of Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1986), the econometric speci￿cation of production
systems that involve damage-control inputs has been widely debated. By and large, within agricultural
economics, this debate has centered on the proper speci￿cation of the production role that pesticides play.
Even the most casual reading of this literature highlights two salient characteristics. First, the debate focuses
almost exclusively on the representation of damage-control inputs in single-output, plant-based production
systems. And, second, the primary emphasis is on properly measuring pest damage to planned (maximal)
output and the marginal productivity of pesticides.
The interest in the marginal productivity of pesticides is easy to understand. Economic e¢ ciency dictates
that the marginal social bene￿t from applying pesticides be equated to marginal social cost. The marginal
productivity of pesticides is an important component of marginal social bene￿t.
It seems equally obvious why economists should be interested in measuring pest damage to output.
Certainly, proper modelling of the economic damage caused by pests requires proper modelling of output
damage. But output damage, considered alone, does not measure accurately the producer￿ s private cost of
pests.
Output damage, as traditionally de￿ned, instead measures pest damage to maximal potential output
realized from a given bundle of inputs. A more appropriate economic measure of the producer￿ s private
cost of pests is the producer￿ s pro￿t (quasi rent) loss due to pests. Conventional damage measures are
an important component of this private cost, but they do not fully capture it. In fact, as we show, that
for rational pro￿t maximizers conventional output damage measures systematically misstate the revenue and
pro￿t losses associated with the presence of pests.
The cause of the divergence between the traditional pest-damage measure and the producer￿ s private cost
of pests is easy to trace. The former does not capture the economic adjustments to input use and production
practices that rational economic decisionmakers make when using damage-control inputs. It simply measures
physical damage to planned output, holding all inputs ￿xed, that actual pest infestations incur. The latter
measure, on the other hand, accounts for rational actions taken to ameliorate pest damage, and thus captures
the actual economic losses to farmers.
The implications of a possible divergence between traditional pest-damage measures and the actual
economic loss due to pests are potentially important on a number of levels. First, and most simply, it
is important in and of itself in empirical economics to get the numbers right. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, the social costs and bene￿ts of damage-control inputs are important matters of public concern.
Many damage-control agents, such as pesticides, are often thought to have social costs (or bene￿ts) that
diverge from the private costs (or bene￿ts) of individuals making decisions about their level of application.
Thus, they have become a natural target for public regulation. Informed public regulation requires an
accurate accounting of private, as well as social, costs and bene￿ts. If the traditional measure of pest
damage does not capture the producer￿ s private cost of pests, sound policy making requires, at a minimum,
that it be adjusted so that it does.
Following Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1986), Chambers and Lichtenberg (1994), and Fox and Weersink
(1995), this paper develops a method for measuring quasi-rent losses due to pests and implements the method
empirically using a panel-data set for Greek olive production. Our method has a number of important by-
products, which merit independent study on their own. It yields both a measure of the marginal productivity
of pesticides and pest damage to planned (maximal) output. The latter is the conventional damage measure
considered in the literature. But because the method also provides a measure of the economic damage
1associated with the presence of pests, that economic damage is decomposable into its component parts,
one of which includes damage to planned output. In addition, our method allows one to determine how
pesticide application biases the optimal use of other variable inputs, how it a⁄ects the structure of quasi
rents collected by quasi-￿xed factors of production, and the general optimal supply-response characteristics
of a farmer confronting pests.
In what follows, we ￿rst develop the basic production model. The damage speci￿cation follows the path-
breaking work of Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1986), as extended by Fox and Weersink (1995) to allow for the
potential presence of increasing marginal returns to the damage-control agent. The basic production model
is then incorporated into a short-run supply response framework based on rational producer behavior. Here,
we follow Chambers and Lichtenberg (1994) and develop a dual representation of the supply-response system
associated with the Lichtenberg-Zilberman-Fox-Weersink speci￿cation of the damage-control technology.
A dual representation of the supply-response system is used because it facilitates measurement of the
economically rational response producers make in the presence of pests. A primal representation, which
is often used to obtain traditional damage measures, retards accurate measurement of such e⁄ects. And
practical measurement from a primal system is only available after the inversion of ￿rst-order conditions
associated with optimal behavior. This inversion process, because of its numerical nature, necessarily intro-
duces yet another form of approximation error. The guiding principle is simple. The producer￿ s pro￿t loss
is the appropriate measure of the economic loss due to pests. Therefore, we model the focus of our interest
directly rather than indirectly as a primal approach would require.
After the representation is developed, we then show how to decompose the economic damage associated
with the presence of pests, how to measure the shadow prices of damage-control agents, how to measure how
pesticide application biases variable input use, and how pesticide application a⁄ects the relative returns to
quasi-￿xed factors of production. An econometric speci￿cation of our theoretical model follows, and that
econometric speci￿cation is ￿t using a panel data set on Greek olive producers. The empirical results are
then presented and thoroughly discussed, and the paper concludes.
1 The Basic Model
For a given level of initial pest incidence, the farm production technology in period t for a farmer with
farm-speci￿c characteristics, s; is represented by the closed, nonempty, production possibilities set
T (t;s) = f(x;k;z;y;br) : (x;k;z) can produce y for a given level of (br;s;t)g
where x 2 RN
+ is a vector of variable inputs, k 2 RK
+ is a vector of quasi-￿xed inputs, y is output,1 br
represents the level of pest infestation (more generally, damage-agent incidence), and z 2 RZ
+ is a vector of
damage-control agents.
Following Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1986), Fox and Weersink (1994), Saha, Shumway, and Havenner
(1997), and an extensive biological literature,2 our speci￿cation of the technology simultaneously recognizes
the asymmetric role that damage-control agents play in the production technology while permitting them to
1Our empirical application is for a single-product tree crop, olives. Therefore, to avoid excessive notation, we develop
the model for a scalar output technology. The extension to a multi-output production system is straightforward and largely
notational.
2Some studies, for example, Carpentier and Weaver (1997) while recognizing the validity of the asymmetric speci￿cation for
￿eld-trial type data question its use for data drawn from farm-level observations.
2exhibit increasing marginal returns, thus,
T (t;s) = f(x;k;z;y;br) : y ￿ g (br;z;k;t;s)f (x;k;t;s)g;
where f (x;k;t;s) represents maximal output obtainable from variable and quasi-￿xed input use, and g (br;z;k;t;s);
whose range is restricted to lie in [0;1]; represents the percentage of maximal output realized in the pres-
ence of pest infestation, br; with application of damage-control agents at z: Thus, 1 ￿ g (br;z;k;t;s); which
represents percentage of output lost in the presence of pests, is the traditional measure of pest damage.
Because our empirical application is to a tree crop and our capital measures include both land and capital
equipment, we assume that the long-run maximal output technology exhibits constant returns to scale in x
and k, and thus
f (￿x;￿k;t;s) = ￿f (x;k;t;s) ￿ > 0:
As will become apparent, our speci￿cation allows the technology to exhibit either increasing or decreasing
marginal returns in the damage-control agents, z; so that this assumption does not imply that T (t;s) exhibits
either constant or nonconstant returns to scale.
The primary focus in the empirical literature on damage control has been on the estimation of both
components of actual production, maximal or planned production, f (x;k;t;s); and damage to planned
production, 1￿g (br;z;k;t;s): A major theme of this paper is that the value of damage to planned production
does not accurately measure either the actual revenue loss farmers su⁄er in the presence of pests or their lost
pro￿t due to the presence of pests. To demonstrate these points, we need an economic model of farmer￿ s gains
and losses in the presence of pests. That model is provided by a restricted-pro￿t function which measures
the quasi rents that a farmer collects from his or her quasi-￿xed input endowment.
To develop the restricted-pro￿t function for this technology, it is ￿rst convenient to develop the restricted-
pro￿t function that would prevail in the absence of any pests. That pro￿t function gives the maximum
maximorum quasi rent obtainable from a ￿xed input endowment. For a farmer facing output price p 2 R++
and variable input prices w 2 RN
++; the maximal quasi rent from farming with a quasi-￿xed input endowment
of k is that obtained in the absence of a pest infestation when g = 1 :
￿ (p;w;k;t;s) = max
x;y
fpy ￿ w0x : y ￿ f (x;k;t;s)g
= max
x











￿ (p;w;k;t;s) is a restricted-pro￿t function de￿ned in terms of the quasi-￿xed factors, and c(w;f;k;t;s) is
the minimal variable cost associated with production in the absence of any pesticide damage.
By standard results (Chambers, 1988), ￿ (p;w;k;t;s) is sublinear (positively linearly homogeneous and
convex) in (p;w); nondecreasing in p; nonincreasing in w: It also satis￿es Hotelling￿ s Lemma. Because
f (x;k;t;s) exhibits constant returns to scale, ￿ (p;w;k;t;s) is also positively linearly homogeneous in the
endowment of quasi-￿xed factors of production
￿ (p;w;￿k;t;s) = ￿￿ (p;w;k;t;s) ￿ > 0:
Thus, if the technology is smooth, the Clark-Wicksteed product exhaustion theorem applies and the quasi-
rent to the ￿xed input endowment can be decomposed into returns to each of the quasi-￿xed factors of
3production as
(1) ￿ (p;w;k;t;s) = ￿k (p;w;k;t;s)
0 k;
where ￿k (p;w;k;t;s) 2 RK denotes the gradient of ￿ in k: In words, each element of ￿k (p;w;k;t;s) de￿nes
a shadow price for the relevant quasi-￿xed factor and the inner product of the shadow-price vector and the
vector of ￿xed factors completely exhausts quasi-rent. The product of a quasi-￿xed factor￿ s shadow price
and its level has the natural interpretation as that quasi-￿xed factor￿ s quasi rent.
The separable nature of the asymmetric damage speci￿cation inherent in T (t;s) makes it relatively
easy to go from maximal quasi-rent to quasi-rent that will be realized in the presence of pests. From the
speci￿cation of T (t;s); the quasi-rent from farming obtained in the presence of a pest infestation, br; and
damage-control agent usage of z is
￿(p;w;k;br;z;t;s) = max
x;y
fpy ￿ w0x : y ￿ g (br;z;k;t;s)f (x;k;t;s)g
= max
x fpg (br;z;k;t;s)f (x;k;t;s) ￿ w0xg
= ￿ (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s)
The trick in moving from the ￿rst line of the de￿nition to the second (and then the third) is to recognize that
when there is no pest damage, the farmer￿ s revenue is pf (x;k;t;s): In short, the farmer collects all of the
revenue associated with planned or maximal output. When there is pest damage, however, the farmer only
collects pg (br;z;k;t;s)f (x;k;t;s) where g (br;z;k;t;s) ￿ 1; so that pg (br;z;k;t;s) ￿ p: Thus, the damage
to planned output, in economic terms, takes the exact same form as a reduction in the e⁄ective output price
to farmers from p to pg (br;z;k;t;s): This permits incorporating damage into quasi rent via the output price
term in the restricted-pro￿t function that would prevail in the absence of pests.
If there exist unique quasi-rent maximizing input demands, x(p;w;k;br;z;t;s); and supply, y (p;w;k;br;z;t;s);
then by Hotelling￿ s Lemma, ￿(p;w;k;br;z;t;s) is di⁄erentiable in (w;p) and
x(p;w;k;br;z;t;s) = ￿￿w (p;w;k;br;z;t;s)
= ￿￿w (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s);
and
y (p;w;k;br;z;t;s) = ￿p (p;w;k;br;z;t;s)
= ￿1 (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s)g (br;z;k;t;s);
where ￿w 2 RN
￿ denotes the gradient of ￿ in w, ￿p the partial derivative of ￿ in p; and ￿1 the partial
derivative of ￿ with respect to its ￿rst argument. Thus, ￿1 (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s) represents the optimally
chosen maximal potential output associated with a pest infestation of br and pesticides applied at level z;
and optimal supply, y (p;w;k;br;z;t;s); is the product of that maximal potential output and g (br;z;k;t;s):
42 Measuring Pest Damage, Marginal Returns to Damage-Control
Agents, and Damage-Control Biases
2.1 Measuring Economic Loss due to Pests3
In the absence of pests, br = 0; a farmer with a quasi-￿xed factor endowment of k who applies no damage-
control agents realizes a quasi-rent of
￿(p;w;k;0;0;t;s) = ￿ (p;w;k;t;s):
In the presence of a pest infestation at br a farmer who applies damage-control agents at level z realizes
quasi-rents equalling:
￿(p;w;k;br;z;t;s) = ￿ (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s);
which, so long as g (br;z;k;t;s) > 0; can be rewritten as
￿(p;w;k;br;z;t;s) = ￿ (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s)
= pg (br;z;k;t;s)￿1 (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s) + w0￿w (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s)








The quasi-rent loss associated with a pest infestation of br if the farmer applies damage-control agents at z
is thus the di⁄erence between maximal possible quasi-rent and quasi-rent realized in the presence of pests.
In terms of symbols that becomes.
Q(p;w;k;br;z;t;s) = ￿(p;w;k;0;0;t;s) ￿ ￿(p;w;k;br;z;t;s)
= ￿ (p;w;k;t;s) ￿ ￿ (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s)
￿ 0;
or in percentage terms




A complete measure of the economic damage that the farmer su⁄ers from the presence of the pest is obtained
by adding the cost of applying the damage-control agent to Q(p;w;k;br;z;t;s): Given Q(p;w;k;br;z;t;s);
however, total economic damage is trivially calculated. Hence, our focus in what follows is exclusively on
Q(p;w;k;br;z;t;s) and q (p;w;k;br;z;t;s)
Pest damage studies have concentrated on 1 ￿ g (br;z;k;t;s); which measures physical damage to the
planned level of production. Q(p;w;k;br;z;t;s); on the other hand, takes account of both optimal supply
and variable-input adjustments that are induced by the presence of the pest. A simple decomposition of
Q(p;w;k;br;z;t;s) illustrates:
Q(p;w;k;br;z;t;s) = R(p;w;k;br;z;t;s) ￿ C (p;w;k;br;z;t;s);
where
R(p;w;k;br;z;t;s) = p[y (p;w;k;0;0;t;s) ￿ y (p;w;k;br;z;t;s)] (2)
= p[￿1 (p;w;k;t;s) ￿ g (br;z;k;t;s)￿1 (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s)];
3This section di⁄ers markedly from the initial version of the paper. A particularly thoughtful comment by a reviewer spurred
the additional theoretical analysis that led to those changes. We would like to thank him or her for the contribution.
5and
C (p;w;k;br;z;t;s) = w0 [x(p;w;k;0;0;t;s) ￿ x(p;w;k;br;z;t;s)] (3)
= w0 [￿w (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s) ￿ ￿w (p;w;k;t;s)]:
R(p;w;k;br;z;t;s) measures the revenue loss due to the presence of pests. Thus, it can be thought of as
the revenue (supply) e⁄ect. C (p;w;k;br;z;t;s) measures the di⁄erence in optimal variable cost associated
with the absence and presence of pest. It can be thought of as the cost (variable input) e⁄ect.
g (br;z;k;t;s) is a clearly a component of R(p;w;k;br;z;t;s). But g (br;z;k;t;s), which measures the
direct damage done by pests to output, ignores components of the revenue e⁄ect and all of the cost e⁄ect in
Q(p;w;k;br;z;t;s):
2.1.1 Comparing Damage Measures
There are at least three natural measures of pest damage. The ￿rst is the traditional measure, 1 ￿
g (br;z;k;t;s); which measures physical damage to potential maximal output. A second is R(p;w;k;br;z;t;s);
which measures the revenue loss due to pests. And the third is Q(p;w;k;br;z;t;s): We now compare these
three measures.
The di⁄erence between maximal potential output in the absence of pests and output realized in the
presence of pests is the revenue e⁄ect divided by the price of output:
R(p;w;k;br;z;t;s)
p
= y (p;w;k;0;0;t;s) ￿ y (p;w;k;br;z;t;s)
= ￿1 (p;w;k;t;s) ￿ g (br;z;k;t;s)￿1 (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s):
The traditional measure of output loss equals maximal potential output in the presence of pests times
damage, or
(1 ￿ g (br;z;k;t;s))￿1 (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s):
Subtracting this latter pest-loss measure from R
p gives the following measure of the di⁄erence between the
two loss measures
DRg (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s) := ￿1 (p;w;k;t;s) ￿ ￿1 (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s) ￿ 0:
The inequality follows because restricted pro￿t is convex in output price and p ￿ pg. Hence, we conclude that
(1 ￿ g (br;z;k;t;s))￿1 (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s) understates the output loss associated with the presence of
pests.The amount that the traditional measure of output loss understates the true economic output loss equals
the di⁄erence between maximal potential output in the absence of pests and maximal potential output in
the presence of pests.







g (br;z;k;t;s) ￿ g (br;z;k;t;s);




y(p;w;k;0;0;t;s) : Thus, we conclude that the traditional damage measure understates both the percentage of
output and the percentage of revenue loss caused by pests.
The economic explanation is as follows. A nonzero pest infestation, br > 0; ensures that there will be some
pest damage. Damage-control activities can mitigate this output loss, but the loss is only entirely averted
6when z is applied at levels that ensure g (br;z;k;t;s) = 1: A rational farmer, realizing that variable-input
use in the presence of the pest infestation is less pro￿table than its absence, responds by lowering his or her
maximal potential output from ￿1 (p;w;k;t;s) to ￿1 (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s) because pg (br;z;k;t;s) ￿ p:
In the asymmetric speci￿cation, a farmer￿ s rational response to the presence of pests is isomorphic to his
or her rational response to a decrease in the price of output. Maximal potential supply adjusts downward.
This curtailment of maximal potential supply, which represents a true economic loss, is not captured by
g (br;z;k;t;s): Because the downward supply adjustment induced by the presence of the pest is ignored, the
revenue and output loss is understated.
In examining DRg (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s), one sees that the di⁄erence approaches zero as g ap-
proaches one, that is, as the traditional damage measure becomes relatively small. But as the tradi-
tional damage measure grows (g declines), the divergence between the two measures grows at a rate gov-
erned by the elasticity of supply for maximal potential supply. The greater that elasticity, the greater is
DRg (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s), and thus the greater the bias that will be realized as a consequence of using
1 ￿ g to measure damage.
We now compare 1￿g (br;z;k;t;s) and the quasi-rent loss measure in percentage terms, q (p;w;k;br;z;t;s):
Subtracting 1￿g (br;z;k;t;s) from q (p;w;k;br;z;t;s) gives (after dropping function arguments on g (br;z;k;t;s)
for notational compactness)
q ￿ (1 ￿ g) = 1 ￿
￿ (pg;w;k;t;s)
￿ (p;w;k;t;s)





g￿ (p;w;k;t;s) ￿ ￿ (pg;w;k;t;s)
￿ (p;w;k;t;s)
=
￿ (pg;wg;k;t;s) ￿ ￿ (pg;w;k;t;s)
￿ (p;w;k;t;s)
￿ 0:
The fourth equality, which is crucial in this derivation, follows from the positive linear homogeneity of
restricted-pro￿t functions in input and output prices. The ￿nal inequality then follows because the restricted-
pro￿t function is nonincreasing in input price and g (br;z;k;t;s) ￿ 1:
Thus, (1 ￿ g) underestimates, in percentage terms, the quasi-rent loss due to the presence of pests, q:
What about actual losses in dollar terms? The traditional damage measure in dollar terms is output price
times the quantity loss
p(1 ￿ g (br;z;k;t;s))￿1 (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s):
Subtracting this measure from Q(p;w;k;br;z;t;s) gives the following measure of the bias expressed as a
function of g
B (g) = ￿ (p;w;k;t;s) ￿ ￿ (pg;w;k;t;s) ￿ p(1 ￿ g)￿1 (pg;w;k;t;s):
Using Hotelling￿ s lemma and our de￿nitions allows us to rewrite this expression to
B (g) : = p[￿1 (p;w;k;t;s) ￿ ￿1 (pg;w;k;t;s)] + w0 [￿w (p;w;k;t;s) ￿ ￿w (pg;w;k;t;s)] (5)
= p[￿1 (p;w;k;t;s) ￿ ￿1 (pg;w;k;t;s)] ￿ C (p;w;k;br;z;t;s)
as the di⁄erence between quasi-rent loss due to pests and the traditional dollar measure of pest damage.
The ￿rst term in this expression, p[￿1 (p;w;k;t;s) ￿ ￿1 (pg;w;k;t;s)]; which is the dollar amount that the
traditional damage measure underestimates actual revenue loss, is necessarily positive as already shown.
7The second term in (5), C (p;w;k;br;z;t;s), is also positive. For smooth technologies, this is established
as follows. Di⁄erentiating w0￿w (p;w;k;t;s) with respect to p gives w0￿w1 (p;w;k;t;s); which by Young￿ s
theorem on symmetry of partial derivatives equals w0￿1w (p;w;k;t;s): The positive linear homogeneity of
￿ (p;w;k;t;s) implies, however, that w0￿1w (p;w;k;t;s) equals ￿p￿11 (p;w;k;t;s); which in turn, is nega-
tive by convexity of the restricted-pro￿t function. Hence, w0￿w (p;w;k;t;s) is decreasing in p; and, thus,
C (p;w;k;br;z;t;s) must be nonnegative.
In more economic terms, the presence of pests ensures the presence of some damage. As already shown,
rational producers respond by lowering their maximal planned output. This supply reduction evokes a cost
saving, which is captured by C (p;w;k;br;z;t;s); as rational producers reduce their use of some inputs and
rearrange the utilization of other inputs.
Thus, whether the traditional measure of damage value understates or overstates the true economic value
of pest damage depends upon the relative magnitudes of the two positive terms in (5). Notice, however, that
for smooth technologies limg!1 B (g) = 0; while di⁄erentiation establishes
B0 (g) = ￿p2 (1 ￿ g)￿11 (pg;w;k;t;s) ￿ 0;
by the convexity of restricted pro￿t in variable input and output prices. Therefore, for smooth technologies
the damage measures are approximately the same as long as damage is relatively small (g is close to 1),
but B (g) becomes increasingly positive as damage increases (g decreases) at a rate that is governed by
the elasticity of supply. The more elastic is supply, the quicker the divergence grows. Moreover, under the
presumption that limp!0 ￿1 (p;w;k;t;s) = 0; that is pro￿t maximizing supply for a zero output price is zero,
then limg!0 B (g) = ￿ (p;w;k;t;s):
We have shown that the traditional damage measure, 1 ￿ g; always understates both revenue loss and
quasi-rent loss in both absolute and percentage terms. The only comparison that remains is between
Q(p;w;k;br;z;t;s) and R(p;w;k;br;z;t;s): It was established above that C (p;w;k;br;z;t;s) > 0; from
which it follows that R(p;w;k;br;z;t;s) ￿ Q(p;w;k;br;z;t;s): The economic reason, of course, is that
revenue loss ignores the cost saving that is associated with rational pro￿t maximizing producers conserving
on variable cost as a consequence of their rational supply reduction.























The ￿rst equality follows from the positive linear homogeneity of restricted-pro￿t functions, as does the
second. Alternatively, the second can be recognized, via Hotelling￿ s lemma, as a consequence of the fact
that optimal supply is homogeneous of degree zero in (p;w) and thus ￿1 (pg;wg;k;t;s) = ￿1 (p;w;k;t;s)
8for g > 0: Economically, for this condition to be satis￿ed, revenue share￿ s in quasi-rent must decrease as a
resulting of radially reducing all variable input prices by the traditional damage measure. Put another way,
revenue must increase less in percentage terms than quasi-rent as a result of such a rescaling of variable
input prices.
3 Marginal Returns and Biases
A primary thrust of the empirical debate on pesticide productivity concerns the appropriate measurement
of the shadow prices (marginal returns, marginal productivity) of damage-control agents. For a smooth
technology with a quasi-￿xed input endowment of k, the shadow prices of the damage-control agents, z; are
their marginal contributions to quasi-rent (variable pro￿t):
(6) ￿z (p;w;k;br;z;t;s) = ￿1 (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s)pgz (br;z;k;t;s);
where ￿z denotes the gradient of ￿ with respect to z and gz denotes the gradient of g with respect to z:
Because ￿1 (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s)g (br;z;k;t;s) is realized optimal supply in the presence of pests, each
component of ￿z (p;w;k;br;z;t;s), thus, equals the marginal revenue associated with a small change in the
use of the associated damage-control agent.
To determine how the shadow prices of damage-control agents adjust to changes in their usage, we
examine
(7) ￿zz (p;w;k;br;z;t;s) = ￿11p2gzg0
z + ￿1pgzz;
where ￿zz and gzz are the Hessian matrices of ￿ and g, respectively, in z. In the asymmetric speci￿cation,
changes in z, thus, have two distinct e⁄ects on its shadow price.
These di⁄erent e⁄ects are most easily illustrated in the case of a single damage-control input. In that case,
an increase in z changes damage control (damage) at the margin by gz (￿gz). If the damage-control agent￿ s
marginal product is positive, damage control increases marginally by gz: In the asymmetric speci￿cation,
this is equivalent to increasing the "e⁄ective price" of the commodity, pg; by pgz: This increase in the
e⁄ective price of the output, which is the result of a greater percentage of maximal output being realized
while holding variable inputs constant, elicits a positive supply response. That supply response yields more
revenue at prevailing prices. This e⁄ect is measured by the term, ￿11p2gzg0
z; in expression (7).
Increasing z at the margin, however, also changes its marginal e⁄ectiveness in controlling pests, and this
change is captured by gzz: If there are increasing returns (marginal productivity) to pesticide use, as usually
interpreted in the pesticide-productivity literature, then gzz > 0. If there are diminishing returns (marginal
productivity) then gzz < 0: Virtually all of the debate in the literature on pesticide productivity on marginal
returns has centered on whether this component of the overall e⁄ect is positive or negative. Our empirical
speci￿cation, following Fox and Weersink (1995), allows for either gzz < 0 or gzz > 0.4
Because of the supply-response e⁄ect, diminishing marginal returns in the usual sense, that is, gzz < 0;










4Hennessy (1997) presents a detailed analysis of the conditions required for g to exhibit increasing or decreasing marginal
returns in z in the Fox and Weersink (1995) speci￿cation.
9The left-hand side, by Hotelling￿ s Lemma, is the elasticity of supply while the right-hand side measures the
￿ exibility of gz to changes in the use of the damage-control agent. Our empirical speci￿cation that follows
does not predetermine either the elasticity of supply or the ￿ exibility of gz.5
Expression (6) is, perhaps, the most obvious way to think about shadow prices of damage-control agents.
But another interpretation is available. From (1),
￿(p;w;k;br;z;t;s) = ￿ (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s)
= ￿k (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s)
0 k:
Hence, for damage-control agent z





where ￿k1 (pg (br;z;k;t;s);w;k;t;s) denotes the vector composed of the partial derivatives of each shadow
price for the elements of k with respect to pg: Hence, the shadow price of damage-control agent can be
decomposed into that damage-control agent￿ s marginal contributions to the quasi rents attributable to k:















Shares of the ￿xed factors in total quasi rent must sum to one. Di⁄erentiating this distribution rule with

























@zu > 0; marginal applications of zu increase kv￿ s share of
quasi rent and decrease it otherwise. Therefore, we shall say in the following that damage control agent zu






@zu > 0 and diminishes the
quasi rent otherwise. A damage-control agent enhances the quasi-rent to kv only if marginal applications of
the damage-control agent increase kv￿ s quasi rent more in percentage terms than they increase total quasi
rent, ￿(p;w;k;br;z;t;s) in percentage terms.
Whether damage-control agents enhance or diminish the returns to the various quasi-￿xed factor yields
potentially important information on how damage-control agents interact with quasi-￿xed factors in the
production process. One can, of course, de￿ne a similar decomposition for how output and variable input
shares in total quasi-rent are a⁄ected by changes in application rates of damage-control inputs. Such a
decomposition, by convoluting supply adjustment and input adjustments, partially disguise the manner in
5Notice, however, that in the presence of linear pricing of the damage-control agents, ￿zz ￿ 0 is required in the neighborhood
of any well-de￿ned pro￿t maximizing equilibrium.
10which variable inputs interact with one another, and how that interaction is a⁄ected by the application of
pesticides.
To examine the interaction between variable inputs in a fashion that is directly comparable to the standard
notion of substitution and complementary behavior among inputs, we examine how z a⁄ects the optimal
allocations of cost shares across variable inputs for a given level of realized output. By Shephard￿ s Lemma,
the cost-minimizing demand for the jth variable input, when realized output is ￿ y; pest infestation is br; and











and the positive linear homogeneity of variable costs in variable input prices ensures that the sum of individual












































interpretable as the nth variable-input￿ s share in variable cost.
























interpretable as the marginal e⁄ect of the damage-control agent on the nth variable input￿ s cost share.
If marginal changes in zu increase the nth variable-input￿ s cost share, we will say that application of the
damage-control agent is input n using because it promotes a greater relative utilization of input n than prior










is negative, we will say that the damage-control agent is input n saving because its application promotes
a smaller relative utilization of input n: Applications of a damage-control input are input n saving only if
marginal applications of the damage-control input cause input n￿ s wage bill to fall more in percentage terms
than it reduces (in percentage terms) variable-cost of all the non-damage-control, variable inputs. As an
intuitive example of input n saving damage-control agents, one might think in terms of herbicides applied
to control weed growth. If weed clearing in the absence of the herbicide required hand pulling, one would
expect the herbicide to be labor saving.
114 Data
The data used in our empirical analysis are for olive production and were obtained from the Greek National
Agricultural Research Foundation (NAgReF). The data consist of a panel of observations drawn from forty-
￿ve (45) olive-growing farms located in the western part of the Greek island of Crete. Between 1999 and 2004,
extension agents from the NAgReF undertook a small-scale survey designed to investigate the e⁄ectiveness
of six di⁄erent pesticide ingredients against the olive-fruit ￿ y Bactrocera oleae (Gmellin). Bactrocera oleae
is the only signi￿cant pest that attacks olive trees. It burrows into the fruit, where it then reproduces
(May, beginning of June). Infected fruit fall to the ground well before they mature. During the May-
October cropping season, the ￿ y has three or four di⁄erent biological cycles depending on the prevailing
environmental and climatic conditions. High humidity and air temperature levels encourage larger pest
populations.
The surveyed farms were all located in the same geographical area in the western part of Crete. That
portion of Crete is quite specialized in olive-tree cultivation. The di⁄erent pesticide materials were applied
approximately every two weeks in response to observations on the existing pest populations. Pest population
was measured using chemical traps installed on every 500 m2 of the farm￿ s plot. The number of ￿ ies captured
was then extrapolated to obtain a measure of the whole pest population for each farm. The data set also
contains information on production volumes, input expenses, as well as a number of farm-speci￿c variables
including demographic characteristics, environmental conditions and extension services provision. Summary
statistics of the variables are presented in Table 1.
One output and three variable inputs were distinguished. Output includes olive-oil quantities sold o⁄the
farm plus quantities consumed in farm households during the cropping year. The price of olive-oil is that
obtained by farmer at the date that farm production is sold to the market, adding subsidies and subtracting
indirect taxes. Because Greece is the third largest olive-oil producing country after Spain and Italy, the
prices exhibit considerable variation during the same cropping year. The perennial feature of olive-tree
(good cropping years are followed by less productive ones) and di⁄erences in cropping seasons across the
three major producing countries results in very variable prices for olive oil at the farmgate.
The variable inputs are labour, chemical fertilizers, and intermediate inputs. Data on the labor input
consist of hours worked disaggregated by hired, self-employed, and unpaid family workers. Compensation
of hired farm workers is de￿ned as the average hourly wage plus social security taxes paid by farmers.
Labor compensation data are not directly available for self-employed and unpaid family workers. Therefore,
self-employed and unpaid family workers are imputed the mean wage earned by hired farm workers. Olive
farmers utilize a mixture of chemical fertilizers depending on the soil quality and speci￿c needs of their trees.
These include nitrate, phosphorous and potassium fertilizers that are applied after the harvesting season
(January-March). The aggregate price of fertilizers was computed using a Divisia index with the cost-shares
of each one of the di⁄erent fertilizers used as weights. Finally, the intermediate input consists of goods used
in olive-oil production during the cropping year, whether purchased from outside the farm or withdrawn from
beginning inventories. These include fuel and electric power, storage expenses, irrigation water, measured
in euros. Again the aggregate price of intermediate inputs was computed using Divisia methods, and the
aggregate quantity was then obtained.
The quasi-￿xed inputs used in the analysis are land devoted to olive-tree cultivation, measured in strem-
mas (1 stremma equals 0.1 hectare), and capital stock. Capital stock observations were computed using the
perpetual-inventory method as described by Ball et al. (1993). The damage-control agent includes the di⁄er-
ent pesticide materials measured in litres converted into a single index. There are also data on farm-speci￿c
12characteristics. These include data on the farmer￿ e education level, measured in years of formal schooling,
the number of extension visits per farm, an aridity index de￿ned as the ratio of the average temperature in
the area where the farm is located over the total precipitation in the same area (Stallings, 1960).
To avoid problems associated with units of measurement, all variables were converted into indices, with
the basis for normalization being the representative olive-growing farm. The choice of the representative
farm was based on the smallest deviation of the variables (i.e. output and input levels) from the sample
means.
5 The Econometric Speci￿cation
We chose the following transcendental logarithmic (translog) speci￿cation for ￿ (p;w;k;t;s) :
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j = 0: Here subscript i indexes the farm, subscript t






vq = 0 for all q;
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vh = 0 for all h:
Our econometric speci￿cation of g follows the contribution of Fox and Weersink (1995), which decomposes
g into two components and thus allows for the possibility of increasing returns to the damage-control agent:
(10) git = 1 ￿ exp(￿br
it (1 ￿ ￿it));
where6











Upon subsituting (10) into (9) to obtain ln￿it (pitgit;wit;kit;t;sit); Hotelling￿ s Lemma implies that the
associated supply and variable-input demands in quasi-rent share form are given by
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6After some experimentation k was not included in the econometric speci￿cation of ￿:
13where S
p
it denotes the revenue share in quasi rent and S
j
it denotes the share of the jth variable factor in quasi
rent.
6 Estimation
Because of the nonlinearity imposed by our damage-control speci￿cation (10), the system of supply and
variable-input demand pro￿t shares has been estimated together with the pro￿t function using the full-
information-maximum-likelihood (FIML) method after appending a suitable econometric error structure
to our speci￿cation. The associated likelihood function was maximized using the Berndt, Hall, Hall, and
Hausman (BHHH) algorithm. The FIML estimator has the same asymptotic properties as the three-stage
least squares estimator, and with normally distributed disturbances it is asymptotically e¢ cient (Hausman,
1975). The price of intermediate inputs and the level of cultivated land were used as numeraires in imposing
linear homogeneity in crop and input prices and in quasi-￿xed inputs, respectively.
Although our theoretical speci￿cation treats application of the damage-control agent (pesticides) as a
quasi-￿xed input, its observed values are subject to producer choice and, thus, endogenous econometrically.
To correct for the potential biases, we ran a ￿rst-stage regression of pesticide use against a set of environ-
mental and farmer-speci￿c variables together with the level of pest infestation (summary statistics of the
variables are provided in Table 1). Speci￿cally, as environmental variables we used the average temperature
and humidity levels in the ￿eld as well as the altitude of farm location. High temperature and humidity
levels a⁄ect pest population by creating more favorable environmental conditions for their occurence. On
the other hand, the higher the altitude the lower will be the pest population. Farmer-speci￿c characteristics,
such as the level of education and the provision of extension activities a⁄ect the farmer￿ s understanding
of proper pesticide application. Educated farmers can more easily digest technical information associated
with appropriate pesticide application. At the same time extension visits on farm by extension agents may
provide useful information to farmers on the pest infestation, the maturity stage of pests that also a⁄ect
pesticide application. The predicted value of pesticide application obtained from the ￿rst-stage regresssions
was used in the econometric estimation of the system of supply and variable-input demands (the parameter
estimates of the ￿rst-stage regression are available from the authors upon request).
7 Empirical Results
Estimated values for the parameters of our econometric model are reported in Table 2. These results indicate
that the model ￿ts these data quite well and most parameters are quite precisely estimated.
The estimated supply and input-demand functions are consistent with theory as evidenced by their
implied elasticities reported (at sample means) in the upper panel of Table 3. Speci￿cally, each variable
input demand equation is downward sloping in its own price, and the supply elasticity for olives is positive
and of reasonable magnitude (.894). The input demand elasticities all appear to be of plausible magnitudes,
but we do note that the own-price demand elasticity for intermediate inputs is somewhat higher than that
for either fertilizer or labor. Notice, however, that the estimated elasticity of supply with respect to the
price of intermediate inputs is also quite large and negative suggesting that much of the responsiveness of
intermediate inputs to changes in variable input prices is actually due to a large output e⁄ect (more on this
below). All inputs are nonregressive (normal) in the sense that pro￿t-maximizing input demand elasticities
with respect to the output price are positive and, thus, all supply elasticities with respect to variable input
14prices are negative. All variable inputs are found to be gross complements.
To investigate the pattern of substitution and complementarity more closely, we remove, following Sakai
(1974), Lopez (1984) and Chambers (1988, p. 134), the output e⁄ect from the pro￿t maximizing input
demands and compute the compensated (constant output, cost minimizing) input demand elasticities for the
variable inputs that are implied by our estimated pro￿t function. These elasticities, which provide qualita-
tively the same information as the Allen (one-price, one-factor) elasticities of substitution, are reported in
the middle panel of Table 3 while the associated Morishima (two-price, one-factor) elasticities of substitution
for the estimated system (Mundlak, 1968; Ball and Chambers, 1981; Chambers, 1988; and Blackorby and
Russell, 1989) are presented in the lower panel of Table 3. The reported elasticities are consistent with
theory. All compensated input demands are downward sloping in their own price. Moreover, removal of
the supply-expansion e⁄ect reveals that all variable inputs are net substitutes for one another using either
the one-price, one factor or the Morishima elasticity. Notice, in particular, that the compensated demand
elasticity of intermediate inputs is much smaller than the associated uncompensated demand elasticity con-
￿rming our earlier statement that much of the associated uncompensated input-demand responsiveness is
due to an important and large output e⁄ect suggesting that, for our sample, intermediate input usage is
largely driven by the level of the olive crop planned by the farmer.
The upper panels of Table 4 summarizes our empirical results on the alternative measures of pest damage:
quasi-rent loss, Q(p;w;k;br;z;t;s); the revenue-cost decomposition of quasi-rent loss, R(p;w;k;br;z;t;s)
and C (p;w;k;br;z;t;s); the physical damage to the crop that would have occured in the absence of pesticide
application, 1￿g (br;0;k;t;s); the crop loss due to the presence of pests, 1￿
y(p;w;k;b
r;z;t;s)
y(p;w;k;0;0;t;s) ; the conventional
output damage measure (1 ￿ g (br;z;k;t;s)), and economic damage measure (quasi-rent loss) in percentage
terms. These results are reported at sample means and by pro￿t-quartile averages.
As Table 4 illustrates, the quasi-rent loss, Q(p;w;k;br;z;t;s); for all pro￿t quartiles and the average farm
is smaller than the revenue e⁄ect, R(p;w;k;br;z;t;s): As our theoretical results demonstrate, the di⁄erence
emerges from the cost adjustment, C (p;w;k;br;z;t;s); in terms of planned supply and variable inputs that
farmers make as a result of the lower "e⁄ective" output price caused by the presence of pests. The empirical




1 ￿ g (br;z;k;t;s) (as our theory indicates) and the economic damage from pests for all pro￿t quartiles
and the average farm. It is less, however, than the damage that would occur to planned output in the
absence of pesticide applications. At sample means, physical crop damage (without pesticide application),
the pro￿t maximizing crop loss due to pests; physical crop damage (with pesticides), and economic damage
are, respectively, 19.63%, 18.52%, 17.38%, and 11.55%. Thus, on average, the application of pesticides
reduces physical crop damage by a little over two percentage points from 19.63% to 17.38%. Economic
damage is roughly 2/3 of both 1 ￿
y(p;w;k;b
r;z;t;s)
y(p;w;k;0;0;t;s) (crop loss due to pests) and physical crop damage (with
pesticides). And crop lost as a result of the presence of pests, 1￿
y(p;w;k;b
r;z;t;s)
y(p;w;k;0;0;t;s) ; in percentage terms is about
1.1 points greater than physical crop damage for the sample average (18.52% compared to 17.38%).
In economic terms, the ￿nding for our data set that economic damage is only about 2/3 as large as
physical crop damage, 1￿g (br;z;k;t;s); is particularly interesting. It suggests that the latter dramatically
overstates the actual economic damage that the presence of pests incurs for our sample of farms. Our
empirical results suggest that the olive farmers in our sample are much more e⁄ective at coping with pests
than conventional measures applied to the same data set might suggest. The conventional damage measure
only captures how much damage pests do to physical supply of the commodity produced, while it ignores
the farmer￿ s rational response to pro￿t incentives in other dimensions of his or her farming activities. The
15result, for our data set, is a serious overstatement of pest damage and an understatement of the e⁄ectiveness
of current pesticide practices.
Neither our theory or our empirical results allow us to extrapolate these results beyond our case study.
However, these empirical ￿ndings and our theory do suggest that other studies of pest damage and pesticides
may su⁄er from similar dramatic biases in their results and that the potential for such biases should be taken
seriously in theoretical, empirical, and practical policy analyses of this issue.
All crop-loss measures increase over pro￿t quartiles while economic damage increases over the ￿rst three
quartiles and then declines (slightly) from the third to the fourth. This suggests for our data set that the
di¢ culty of controlling for pests may increase with farm size. This may also partially explain why larger
farms in our sample often use pesticides more intensively than less pro￿table operations.
Having said this, it is interesting to note, however, that the largest farmers are also the most productive
users of pesticides which in turn implies that they use the cooperating inputs more e⁄ectively in combination
with pesticides than the smaller farmers. The bottom panel of Table 4 shows that both proposed measures of
pesticide productivity are increasing across pro￿t quartiles. In particular, the physical pesticide productivity
measure for the largest pro￿t quartile is 28 times larger than that for the smallest quartile, 8 times larger
than the second, and almost 4 times larger than the third quartile. Notice also that, as was expected, the
average product overstates the contribution of pesticides to actual output because some production will
survive even without pesticide application.
Table 5 reports estimates of the shadow price of pesticides. Table 6 reports estimates of the ￿ exibilities
of the shadow prices of pesticides, land, and capital with respect to ￿xed inputs and to variable input
prices. The estimated own ￿ exibilities for pesticides, land, and capital exhibit are all negative. Thus,
although our empirical speci￿cation was speci￿cally chosen, following Fox and Weersink (1995), to permit
the presence of increasing marginal pesticide productivity, we ￿nd that marginal returns (marginal quasi
rents) for pesticides are decreasing for our data set. It, therefore, follows immediately from (8) that marginal
pesticide productivity is also decreasing for our data set. Table 6 also reveals that pesticides, land, and capital
all have shadow prices that are decreasing in all the variable input prices. An application of Hotelling￿ s lemma
thus reveals that increased use of pesticides, land, and capital all tend to increase the utilization of each of
the variable factors of production.
In considering the shadow price of pesticides more closely, one sees several patterns to emerge. First,
there is considerable variability in the shadow price of pesticides across farms. Second, marginal returns to
pesticides grow steadily over pro￿t quartiles and become very large for the highest pro￿t quartile (see Table
5). This is closely related to our previous ￿ndings that the largest farmers are the most productive users
of pesticides and that the need for pesticides increases with output, which result in larger returns at higher
pro￿t quartiles. Third, for all farms and thus all quartiles, the largest component of marginal returns to
pesticides are marginal enhancements to the quasi-rents of capital with a much smaller component coming
from marginal enhancements to quasi-rents of land. But even though the largest component of marginal
returns to pesticides comes from enhancements to capital quasi-rents, pesticides for all farms and all pro￿t
quartiles are land-enhancing and capital-diminishing. Thus, marginal applications of pesticides tend to
increase land￿ s share of quasi rent and decrease capitals. Table 5 also reports the pesticide biases for each
of the variable inputs. Over all quartiles, pesticides are labor and fertilizer using and intermediate materials
saving. Thus, even though increased pesticides usage is associated with increased usage of labor, fertilizer,
and intermediate inputs (as Table 6 indicates), the relatively greater percentage increase (in cost share terms)
is for labor and fertilizer than for intermediate inputs.
168 Concluding Remarks
Using the Lichtenberg-Zilberman-Fox-Weersink damage speci￿cation, we have developed a short-run, supply-
response framework based on pro￿t maximizing producer behavior in the presence of damage agents. We
have shown how that representation can be used to measure and decompose the economic damage associated
with the presence of pests, how to measure the shadow prices of damage-control agents, how to measure the
manner in which pesticide application biases variable input use, and how pesticide application a⁄ects the
relative returns to quasi-￿xed factors of production.
Using a panel data set on Greek olive producers, we have estimated an econometric version of our model,
and obtained empirical estimates of the various e⁄ects for our model. Our empirical results ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????.
The empirical methodology that we employ represents an extension of the dual approach used by Cham-
bers and Lichtenberg (1994) that accommodates the Fox and Weersink (1995) extension of the Lichtenberg
and Zilberman (1986) asymmetric damage speci￿cation. Our data set, which contains observations on pest
infestations, allows us to incorporate such measures directly into the empirical representation of pest dam-
age. Frequently, such data will not be available in conjunction with data on inputs and outputs produced
under actual ￿eld conditions. For example, the Chambers and Lichtenberg (1994) empirical analysis is based
upon a data set that does not contain such information. In such cases, naturally, one cannot implement
exactly the same empirical speci￿cation and procedure as used here. However, one can suitably adjust our
methods, while still accommodating the Fox and Weersink (1995) speci￿cation, to such data and still obtain
empirical estimates of optimal maximal physical output in the absence and presence of pests, quasi rents
in the presence and absence of pests, and marginal productivity of pesticides. Of course, one expects such
estimates to be less precise in the absence of a richer data set, but they are still available empirically.
Both our theoretical and empirical results have potential implications for pesticide policy and pesticide
practice. There are also obvious caveats. For example, as a reviewer points out, our empirical results apply
to the technical practices actually employed by farmers under the assumption that farmers are rational
pro￿t maximizers. As a result, they are not directly comparable to results that are based on the analysis of
damage data drawn from experimental trials in controlled situations for at least two reasons. One, the speci￿c
technology applied under controlled experimental situations may not correspond to the technical practices
that are actually used by farmers in actual operating conditions. And two, even if farmers are rational,
there are obvious reasons, such as the presence of risk and uncertainty, to suspect that they may not act to
maximize pro￿ts. To the extent that farmers employ di⁄erent technical practices than ￿eld experimenters
and that farmers are not pro￿t maximizers, our results can and generally will di⁄er from those obtained via
the analysis of ￿eld experiments. Our results, however, are directly comparable to other studies that have
relied on actual ￿eld data, and what we have shown is that under the assumption of pro￿t maximization,
pest damage as it is usually measured in these studies systematically understates actual crop or revenue loss
due to the presence and typically misstates actual economic damage caused by the presence of pests. Our
empirical results suggest for our data set that more traditional measures of pest damage overstate actual
losses incurred by farmers. Naturally, if this empirical result holds true for other studies, the perception of
the signi￿cance of the pest problem could change markedly. And with that change could come signi￿cant
changes in pesticide policies aimed at ameliorating the negative environmental externalities associated with
the application of pesticides.
That leads to another caveat. The damages that we purport to measure are private damages su⁄ered
by individual farmers as a result of the presence of pests. There are two speci￿c externalities that we have
not addressed, but which will ultimately play an important role in the proper formulation of a scienti￿cally
17sound pesticide policy. One is the environmental or health externality associated with the application of
pesticides. Our measures are silent about this e⁄ect, and proper measurement of that e⁄ect is left to the
other studies. The other emerges from the fact that pests can migrate across holdings of other farmers.7
Thus, pesticide application on one plot can have potentially bene￿cial e⁄ects on damage to other farmers￿
crops. Our approach does not allow us to capture that e⁄ect, and to the extent that the e⁄ect is important,
it suggests that our measures of the marginal productivity of pesticides may be biased.
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